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Abstract 
Although the gulf between the theory and practice in Information Systems is much 
lamented, few researchers have offered a way forward except through a number of 
(failed) attempts to develop a single systematic theory for Information Systems.  In 
this paper, we encourage researchers to re-examine the practical consequences of their 
theoretical arguments.  By examining these arguments we may be able to form a 
number of more rigorous theories of Information Systems, allowing us to draw theory 
and practice together without undertaking yet another attempt at the holy grail of a 
single unified systematic theory of Information Systems. 
 
1 Background 
Theory and Practice 
Although the foundations of Information Systems have been much debated over the 
last 40 years, the practical value of these debates has often been questioned (Bacon 
and Fitzgerald, 2001; Oettinger, 1964).  This has lead to something of a gulf between 
Information Systems theory and practice (Farhoomand and Drury, 1999; Glass, 1996).  
However, if we are to address either theoretical or practical problems, we must also 
deal with the relationship between the two. 
 
For instance, recent papers from the 'theory' side of Information Systems research 
have pushed for the formation of a 'scientific' foundation for Information Systems 
(Farhoomand, 1987; Khazanchi and Munkvold, 2000).  In one sense, pushing for a 
'scientific' foundation for Information Systems is not a bad idea.  The problems start 
when we ask, "what kind of science might underpin Information Systems"? 
 
In recent years, we seem to have seen a concerted push to move Information Systems 
to the same 'scientific foundation' as Computer Science.  The wisdom of such a move 
is questionable.  We could for example point out the scientific nature of Computer 
Science has been a source of active debate for over 50 years (Dijkstra, 2001; 
McGuffee, 2000; Proulx et al, 1996).  However, a more serious criticism would be 
that the original impetus for creating a separate field of Information Systems was the 
sense the context of Computer Science and Information Systems were clearly distinct 
(Davis et al, 1996.  For instance, in the Association for Computational Machinery (Jay 
et al, 1982, p. 784) argued when drawing up a curriculum for undergraduate studies, 
that: 
 
"The IS curriculum teaches information system concepts and processes within two 
contexts, organization functions and management knowledge, and technical 
information systems knowledge" 
 
by contrast: 
 
"… Computer Sciences [sic] tends to be taught within an environment of mathematics, 
algorithms and engineering technology." 
 
The Context of Information Systems 
When researchers form theories in Information Systems, they must be aware of the 
practical context of their theories.  Hence, the properties of "organization functions" 
or "technical information systems knowledge" are not simply a matter of academic 
debate.  Rather, these theoretical assumptions have deep implications for anyone 
using these theories in practice. 
 
In this paper, we will explore one facet of the practical implications of such 
theoretical assumptions by examining two problems in software design.  One problem 
concerns the nature of theories about knowledge and one the nature of theories about 
the world.  Since many Information Systems require (or at least use) a software 
component, we hope this focus will not overshadow the broader arguments of the 
paper. 
 
Software design presents many interesting opportunities to study the practical 
consequences of theoretical assumptions (King and Kimble, 2004a).  Software 
designers' work in the context assumed by researchers in Information Systems: the 
context of "organization functions and management knowledge and technical 
information systems knowledge".  In contrast, computer programs have a distinct 
mathematical and philosophical heritage: one that has remained fixed since at least the 
1930s.  Consequently, program designers must work in the context assumed by 
researchers in Computer Science: the context of "mathematics, algorithms and 
engineering technology". 
 
In short, program designers must use closed, consistent and complete 
characterisations of the world if the final design is to be of any use.  Software 
designers, by contrast, can (and usually do) deal with open, inconsistent and 
incomplete characterisations of the world.  Exactly how the two worlds of software 
and program design can be reconciled is a theoretical question: but the answers are of 
vital importance to any practical solution. 
 
Terminology 
In this paper, we will confine our examination of software design to just two debates: 
one over the term information and another over the term knowledge.  Our aim in this 
paper is not to establish incontrovertible definitions for either of these two terms; 
rather we are interested in the arguments used by others in trying to establish such 
definitions.  Only by understanding these arguments can we gain an insight into the 
practical consequences of theoretical assumptions. 
 
However, we do have to start somewhere.  In this paper, we frame our discussion by 
reference to three important concepts: descriptions, representations and reality.  
Recognising the impossibility of 'philosophy-free' definitions, we define three 
concepts (somewhat arbitrarily) by reference to the Oxford English Dictionary.  We 
hope by doing this our readers will forgive the emphasis given to particular schools of 
philosophical thought during the definition of these three concepts. 
 
For the first of our three concepts, we begin with the unperceived universe: a universe 
beyond the reach of any individual designer.  This unperceived universe we will call 
reality, defined as "… that which underlies and is the truth of appearances or 
phenomena" (Simpson and Weiner, 1989).  In common with academic philosophical 
discussions, our emphasis in the concept of reality is centred on what really exists.  In 
particular, our use of the term 'reality' does not refer to the existence perceived by any 
individual designer (Audi, 1995).  Nonetheless, the perceptions of an individual 
designer can be important to the success of the software design (Sommerville and 
Sawyer, 1997).  Often, it is only by capturing these viewpoints that a designer can 
fully understand the needs of all the users (Graham, 1996).  Thus in software design, 
in addition to 'unperceived reality', we need a notion of 'perceived reality'; we will call 
this perceived reality the representation.  The representation can be thought of as the 
mental model used by an individual designer, or more simply, the world imagined by 
the designer.  The representation can therefore be defined as "[t]he operation of the 
mind in forming a clear image or concept" (Simpson and Weiner, 1989).  However, 
these mental models are not directly transmissible.  Instead, some intermediate form is 
needed; we will call this form the description.  For now, we will simply define 
descriptions as "[a] statement which describes, sets forth, or portrays" (Simpson and 
Weiner, 1989). 
 
2 Knowledge 
Epistemological Positions 
Having defined our three concepts, descriptions, representations and reality, we will 
now examine the first of our theoretical debates, the debate over the term 'knowledge'.  
In philosophical discussions, debates over the term knowledge fall under the realm of 
epistemological arguments.  Within the field of epistemology, researchers in software 
design have often exploited two contrasting extreme viewpoints.  The first is the 
rationalist position, which argues that knowledge is the product of thought and reason 
(Jack, 1993b).  This forms the foundation for software design methods that see the 
concepts 'representation' and 'description' as being equivalent.  For instance, software 
design methods using formal theory frequently draw an equivalence between software 
and program design methods.  Early software design methods, such as the Structured 
System Design Methods used in the 1960s and 1970s, borrow from rationalist 
arguments (Connell and Shafer, 1989). 
 
At the other extreme to rationalist arguments lies the empiricist position.  Researchers 
borrowing from the empiricist position argue that knowledge is the result of 
observation and experience (Jack, 1993a).  Thus, software designers following the 
empiricist position do not see the concepts 'representation' and 'description' as 
equivalent but do see the concepts of reality and the representation as being 
equivalent.  For example, researchers in object-oriented software design methods 
borrow from empiricist arguments by making the distinction between objects as they 
exist in reality, and objects perceived by the software designers, equivalent.  Software 
design methods proposed by researchers using the early forms of general systems 
theory, for instance Peter Checkland's Soft System Methodology, also borrow from 
empiricist arguments Checkland, 1981). 
 
As philosophical arguments, rationalist and empiricist positions represent two extreme 
positions.  Most philosophical schools take a position somewhere in-between these 
two.  Nonetheless, these philosophical arguments are carefully crafted.  Researchers 
in software design, though, have tended to be less philosophically rigorous.  While 
this may seem a trivial point, when we try to apply theories, such philosophical lapses 
have a tendency to bite back. 
 
What happens, for instance, if we try to define and apply a formal theory of object-
oriented design?  Can we simply conflate arguments from both the rationalist and the 
empiricist schools and create a suitable theoretical foundation for a new design 
method?  Alternatively, do the different undercurrents in the two schools of 
philosophy create a tension leading to unsolvable problems when we try to define 
what 'knowledge' means in the context of our new theory? 
 
Epistemology in Software Design 
Practically, while rationalist positions consider the representation to be stable, 
empiricist positions consider the representation to the unstable.  The stability, or 
otherwise, of the representation creates a fundamental problem for applied theories of 
software design borrowing epistemological arguments from different schools of 
thought.  Take, for instance, the object-oriented design of a juice plant control system 
shown in Figure 1.  We will not go into a detailed discussion of the graphical syntax 
of Figure 1, rather we will only consider the practical problems of a designer trying to 
form a description of the cooking tank. 
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(a) Fragment of an Entity-Relationship Diagram of the data manipulated by a Juice 
Plant Control System 
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(b) Fragment of a UML Class Diagram of the Juice Plant Control System 
 
Figure 1: Fragments of an Object-Oriented Design for a Juice Plant Control System 
(Wieringa, 1998 - Figures 5 and 6) 
 
According to empiricist arguments, the designer first forms a representation of the 
cooking tank from the experience of the cooking tank, as pictured in Figure 2(a).  
From this experience, the designer can then form a description of the representation, 
as illustrated in Figure 2(b).  However, simply forming the description from 
representation also counts as experience.  Consequently, the original representation 
must change, to take into account this new experience, as shown in Figure 2(c).  In the 
empiricist view, the representation and the description are always out of step and so 
cannot be equated. 
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Figure 2: The Empiricist Relationship between Description and Representation 
 
To get around this instability, the rationalist approach argues that reason is 
independent of experience.  If the principles of reason are independent of experience, 
then it is possible to bring the description and representation back in step with one 
another.  In the rationalist view, the designer starts with the description (not the 
representation) as illustrated in Figure 3(a).  By applying the principles of reason 
(which are independent of experience), the designer can then form a representation 
from the description, illustrated by Figure 3(b).  Unlike the empiricist position, there 
is nothing that now forces a change to either the description or the representation.  
Thus, the description and representation remain in step, even after a change in the 
description, as indicated in Figure 3(c). 
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Figure 3: The Rationalist Relationship between Description and Representation 
 
Once consequence of the rationalist arguments is the assumption that all designers are 
conscious of their own representations.  In other words, nothing exists in any 
designers' representation that cannot be represented in a description created by 
rational means. 
 
Knowledge created though the full consciousness of an individual mind is called 
explicit knowledge.  By contrast, empiricist approaches also recognise the existence of 
knowledge that a designer is not consciously aware of.  This type of knowledge is 
called tacit knowledge and cannot be turned into a description because the designer 
has no direct awareness of it.  Most empiricist approaches claim (Audi, 1995) that: 
 
"Much of our knowledge is tacit: it is genuine but we are unaware of the relevant 
states of knowledge, even if we can achieve awareness upon suitable reflection." 
 
Current evidence suggests that adequately dealing with tacit knowledge is a real 
problem (Desouza, 2003, Shipman and Marshall, 1999).  Yet, if we adopt a strict 
rationalist position, tacit knowledge should not exist, since such knowledge is defined 
by rational articulation.  We can incorporate tacit knowledge into approaches leaning 
towards rationalist positions (Reeves and Shipman, 1996), but while this makes it 
easier to form software descriptions, forming the corresponding program descriptions 
becomes harder. 
 
Defining Knowledge 
Both the rationalist and empiricist positions offer attractive features as theoretical 
foundations for methods of software design.  However, neither approach offers a 
definition of knowledge that is easily reconcilable with the other.  In the rationalist 
approach, it is easier to create descriptions that are clear and unambiguous, because all 
designers must interpret the description in the same way and all designers have full 
awareness of their own representations.  This eliminates any tacit knowledge that 
might lie behind the design.  By eliminating tacit knowledge, the practical problem of 
creating descriptions of Information Systems should be eased. 
 
However, if we find tacit knowledge is important, moving to empiricist arguments 
may help.  Software design in this view is often more dynamic, with new experiences 
constantly forcing a change in the descriptions of the software design.  However, if 
we move to empirical theories, we have a new problem of design consistency.  
Empiricist approaches expect different designers to have different representations of 
the design - which makes it impossible to demonstrate that the final design is 
consistent. 
 
In short, adopting theories at either extreme will lead to practical problems with either 
the use of tacit knowledge or with design consistency.  We cannot easily short-circuit 
our difficulties by conflating theories from both approaches, since these theories rely 
on incommensurable notions of knowledge.  If we find problems with design 
consistency, using theories based on rationalist arguments may help.  Similarly, if we 
find tacit knowledge is important, using empiricist theories may help.  However, 
neither approach will solve both problems simultaneously: we are always left with an 
uncomfortable compromise. 
 
3 Information 
Ontological Positions 
Leaving aside the problem of knowledge for a moment, we can see the same kinds of 
practical and theoretical issues played out when dealing with the (apparently) more 
straightforward problem of information.  Given the strong theoretical links between 
formal theory and information theory, most researchers in software design methods 
have assumed that the theoretical definition of information has few, if any, practical 
consequences.  Certainly, researchers show far more agreement over the definition of 
the term 'information', compared to the lack of consensus in the debate over the term 
'knowledge' (Meadow and Yuan, 1997). 
 
Nonetheless, software design methods still draw on distinct ontological arguments 
when trying to define 'information'.  In philosophy, the problems of ontology focus on 
questions on the nature of reality.  As with epistemology, there are two broad 
extremes woven into most philosophical positions.  The first forms the foundation for 
realist arguments, which "… emphasises that truth is possible: beliefs are testable 
against 'reality' and that reality is 'knowable'" (Duro et al, 1993).  In other words, 
realist arguments emphasise that reality is independent of a designer.  Software design 
methods from both the formal and object-oriented strands of research often show 
examples of the influence of realist ontological arguments. 
 
Nonetheless, realist ontological arguments are not completely ubiquitous in software 
design.  Older structured software design methods for procedural languages often use 
arguments from the other broad ontological extreme: anti-realism.  Anti-realist 
arguments claim that the perception of reality is so bound to the observing mind that: 
 
"Even if we could impart the highest degree of clearness to our intuition, we should 
not come one step nearer to the nature of objects by themselves."  (Kant, 1966, p 36) 
 
In software design, a common problem lies in trying to reconcile the logical 
perfection of the program design with the behaviour of the real world.  Structured 
software design methods address this problem by separating the logical design (the 
representation) from the physical design (modelling reality). 
 
Ontology in Software Design 
Most modern software design methods prefer seamless design and try not to separate 
the logical and physical designs (Jackson, 2001).  In addition, realist ontological 
arguments offer many attractions to researchers trying to develop the systematic 
theories required by seamless software design.  By emphasising the independence of 
reality in the realist position, it is always possible to reconcile a representation to 
reality.  This becomes an equivalence between a designer's representation and reality. 
 
For example, using the cooking tank problem, the perception of the designer (the 
representation) is fundamentally different to the real object of the cooking tank.  This 
is situation is pictured in Figure 4(a).  If a designer now witnesses a change in the 
properties of a cooking tank, every detail of that change is apparent to the designer.  
Moreover, not every detail of that change depends on the perception of the designer.  
This means that the designer can update their representation to bring it back into line 
with the new reality as shown in Figure 4(b).  After both the representation and reality 
have changed, the independence of the two means that neither need undergo any 
further changes.  Hence, both reality and the representation stay in step and an 
equivalence between the two is preserved as pictured in Figure 4(c). 
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Figure 4: The Realist Relationship between Reality and Representation 
 
In contrast, according to anti-realist arguments, there is no independence between 
reality and a designer's representation.  In the anti-realist arguments, 'reality' cannot be 
said to exist unless it is perceived.  Consequently, we cannot maintain an equivalence 
between these two concepts. 
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Figure 5: The Non-Realist Relationship between Reality and Representation 
 
When dealing with the cooking tank problem, only the representation held by an 
individual designer is relevant.  Whatever 'reality' may or may not be is immaterial as 
it has no influence on the designer, as shown in Figure 5(a).  Only when a designer 
changes their perception of reality, for instance in response to a change in the 
character of a cooking tank, is the representation changed, as shown in Figure 5(b).  
After this change, 'reality' ceases to have an influence on the representation of the 
designer, as pictured in Figure 5(c).  This means that there can be no equivalence 
between representation and reality.  It also means that the individual representations 
of designer are unique to those designers.  There is no common point of reference as 
there is in the realist position.  Again, this means that demonstrating a consistency 
between a representation and reality becomes impossible in the anti-realist position. 
 
Defining Information 
In recent years, most new software design methods prefer a realist ontological 
position as realism offers three useful claims (Audi, 1995): 
 
1. There are real chunks of the world. 
 
2. These chunks exist independently of any designers experience and knowledge of 
them. 
 
3. The chunks have properties and enter into relations independently of the concepts 
used by designers to understand them, or of the language designers use to describe 
them. 
 
Together, these three properties allow the assumption that reality forms an 
independent point of reference.  With an independent frame of reference, designers 
can increase the overall consistency of the design, even if the description is unstable.  
In particular, realism offers a way of defining information directly from properties of 
reality.  If 'data' is formed from reality, we can then see 'information' as simply the 
transformation of 'data' into the perception of an individual designer. 
 
Nevertheless, this also implies 'data' is somehow an objective reference point for all 
designers.  Older methods of software design often dispute this, recognising a 
distinction between the 'ideal' flow of data and data transformation as it occurs in the 
real world.  Thus, older methods of software design use anti-realist arguments to 
separate the description from reality.  This means that a clear, unambiguous 
description is not hampered by the need to demonstrate the same clarity and 
unambiguity in reality.  For structured design methods (and also for methods such as 
Checkland's Soft Systems Methodology), anti-realism offers another way of 
emphasising the influence of designers and subjective interpretations of the world.  
Information in this view is more closely tied with the individual perceptions of 
designers. 
 
As with epistemological arguments, these different ontological arguments are not 
easily reconciled with each other.  Like epistemological arguments, both anti-realist 
and realist arguments also have different expectations of an applied theory.  Under 
realist ontological arguments, the structure of theory should be a close analogue of 
reality.  While under anti-realist ontological arguments, mapping theory to reality is 
non-trivial.  Both forms of philosophical argument therefore emphasise the 
distinctness of design methods following research in different strands. 
 
4 Conclusion 
Problems for a Systematic Applied Theory 
When it comes to applying information systems theories, most researchers start by 
trying to find a single systematic Theory of Information Systems.  However, 
ontological and epistemological differences between the various competing theories 
pose a considerable challenge. 
 
For instance, in developing a systematic formal theory for object-oriented design, we 
must somehow deal with the differing epistemological assumptions of formal and 
object-oriented theory.  Commonly, designers using formal software design methods 
borrow from rationalist epistemological arguments, for instance, by emphasising the 
role of reason and logic in forming descriptions of reality.  By contrast, software 
designers using object-oriented often emphasise the role of observation in trying to 
form descriptions of reality.  So why can we not simply conflate the two positions and 
emphasise both reason and observation?  The short answer is we could, but we must 
be very careful in doing so. 
 
Take, for instance, a definition of knowledge in our new formal theory of object-
oriented design.  Under rationalist epistemological arguments, designers gain 
knowledge through logical deduction from objective first principles.  Further, the 
representation contains nothing that cannot be expressed equally well in the 
description.  Moreover, the description offers a shared, objective touchstone for all 
designers.  If the distinction between the description and the representation is 
effectively non-existent, why should our concept of knowledge in this new framework 
focus on the representation, rather than the description? 
 
In contrast, many object-oriented design methods assume the relationship between the 
description and representation is real and non-trivial.  Borrowing from empiricist 
epistemological arguments, object-oriented software design methods assume the 
software description can, and will, get out of step with a designers representation.  
Indeed whole areas of research into object-oriented design have been devoted to 
trying to reconcile designer's representation with the descriptions (Berry, 2002; 
Pancake, 1995; Schwaber, 2002).  Hence, for object-oriented software design 
methods, we may find compelling reasons for using a definition of knowledge that 
ignores the description and focuses instead on the representation. 
 
Systematic or Rigorous? 
Returning to the context of Information Systems for a moment, even if the context of 
Information Systems is distinct from the context of Computer Science, we might not 
need a single a systematic theory.  Do we, for instance, require all organisations to be 
underpinned by a single systematic theory to be able to reason about their behaviour?  
Such a movement away from systematic theories necessarily invalidate the quest for a 
scientific underpinning of Information Systems.  Economic theories, for example, are 
widely used to reason about the behaviour of organisations although there is not a 
single systematic theory of economics. 
 
In software design, we lack good, rigorous, theories of why particular software design 
methods work or do not work.  Developing a deeper understanding of Information 
Systems (and thereby closing the gulf between theory and practice) may mean a move 
away from universal systematic theories and towards a range of differing but more 
rigorous ones - at least in the short term.  These rigorous theories might one day join 
up into a systematic theory of software design, or they may not.  Indeed, for software 
design at least, we have good theoretical reasons for believing a truly systematic 
theory may never exist (King and Kimble, 2004b). 
 
Developing a range of more rigorous theories may mean abandoning old habits.  In 
software design, researchers often seem to assume that the only valid context for their 
theories is the same as that adopted by program design.  However, formal theories of 
program design cannot incorporate ambiguity.  Although few researchers have looked 
at the benefits of ambiguous design, some research has highlighted the potential 
importance of ambiguity.  For instance, when Mark Gross and Ellen Do investigated 
the aids used by designers they commented: 
 
"We conjecture (based on observation and interviews) that designers prefer to use 
paper and pencil because it supports ambiguity, imprecision and incremental 
formalization of ideas as well as rapid exploration of alternatives."  (Gross and Do, 
1996, p 183) 
 
The search for a systematic theory may be a goal for information systems research: 
but it must not become the only focus of research.  Good, rigorous and even scientific 
theories for Information Systems can be developed without first developing a full 
blown systematic theory.  Similarly, research into software design has often been 
hampered by the search for the philosopher's stone of a systematic theory of software 
design (Berry, 2002; Jackson, 2001). 
 
Information system research has a rich heritage of theories drawn from many different 
disciplines and has stimulated many interesting debates between different areas.  
Some may feel these debates have proved futile and others argue that they have not 
yet yielded the promised fruits.  Nonetheless, we must not abandon the need for 
rigorous theories of information systems in favour of quest for an all encompassing 
systematic one.  To do so will only prevent the convergence of theory and practice: a 
goal we all hope to achieve. 
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